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The Ulema: Neglected Figures 







The Ulema are primarily 
defined by their responsibility for 
the preservation, handing down 
and juridical adaptation of the 
inherited Islamic textual 
knowledge. Even though the 
major social position they 
occupied during centuries 
made them a key research 
topic for historians of the 
Muslim world, they were 
generally neglected by 
social scientists. This lack of 
interest goes back at least to the early post-
colonial period, when modernization theory 
ruled out tradition and religion as relevant 
factors for the future of developing states. Of 
course, from the 1980s on, Western scholars 
began to consider the come back of Islam as 
a powerful social force. However, they did not 
give up the modernization paradigm but 
simply applied it to the religious scene: As 
paragons of “tradition”, the Ulema were not 
only challenged by secular regimes anymore 
but also by Islamist activists and intellectuals, 
i.e. “new” religious leaders trained in 
“modern” universities. Consequently, except 
for cases like Iran and other Shiite 
communities, where an important political 
role was played by the Ulema, the latter 
remained an under-researched topic until the 
end of the 1990s. At this time, 
social scientists eventually 










still suffer from 
several flaws: The 
content of the “Ulema” 
category and the social 
construction of its shifting 
boundaries are rarely discussed; the number 
of case studies is still limited; 
prosopographical and ethnographical data are 
scarce; And the Muslim scholars’ thought and 
political behaviour are given excessive 
attention, whereas the practical dimensions of 
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The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist 
regime in April 2003 by U.S.-led forces has 
inaugurated a new ear of state-society relations 
in Iraqi history. The eradication of a secular 
one-party political system and the crystallization 
of a new democratic order, albeit fragile in 
structure, have opened up fertile ground for the 
growth of various political parties and civic 
associations that are mostly organized along 
ethnic and religious lines. Such organizations 
represent new religious communities and 
political movements with distinct network 
operatives and both civic and militant 
organizational apparatuses that increasingly 
dominate the political landscape of post-
Baathist Iraq using sectarian and anti-
occupation agendas. They have emerged and 
continue to evolve within a new Iraqi public 
sphere that is characterized by old and new 
ethnic and sectarian divisions, which were 
partly caused by the power vacuum created in 
the postwar period.
In terms of state-society relations, the 
upsurge of these various civic-political 
movements, dormant under the Baathist 
regime, has also heralded a new period in Iraq’s 
political history. A sharp decline in state 
domination over the Iraqi public has led to the 
formation new religious movement of grass-root 
force that, in turn, have a 
bearing on the state-building 
processes through the electoral process. In 
sharp contrast to the totalitarian state control of 
public and private spheres under Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, the post-invasion period has 
marked the development of a new kind of civil 
society, mostly composed of religious 
associations and sectarian movements that are 
influencing the structure of the Iraqi state, 
making religion a matter of public agency.
The appearance of a quiescent Shi‘i cleric, 
the grand ayatollah Ali Hussein Sistani, who has 
come to play a significant political order in Iraq, 
serves as a reminder of the critical relevance of 
religion in the postwar era. Since summer 2003, 
Sistani has called for democratic elections and 
citizen participation to advance the 
institutionalization of a legitimate Iraqi 
government. He has also promoted the active 







associations and state institutions in order to 
develop a vibrant civil society against the 
potential resurgence of authoritarian forces 
during transition to democracy. What the Sistani 
phenomenon has revealed since 2003 is how a 
network led by clerics and their representatives 
can reshape the domains of religion and politic 
in ways that legitimizes political activism with 
the support of the traditional authority of an 
orthodox establishment. For the most part, 
Sistani continues to promote a non-secularist 
concept of democratic politics that challenges 
what the Bush administration aimed to achieve 
in Iraq prior to the invasion—namely, the 
formation of a liberal-secular democracy as a 
mode for other states in the Middle East.
This article argues that Sistani’s critical role 
in promoting a non-secularist political order in 
post-Baathist Iraq was a major political project 
in the early postwar period, roughly ending in 
early 2006 with the attack on Samarra mosque 
by Sunni insurgents which escalated sectarian 
tensions and decreased Sistani’s influence. The 
first three years (2003-2006) of U.S.-led 
occupation of Iraq reveal how Sistani 
successfully managed to advance a Shi‘i 
constitutional discourse of democratic 
governance and help expand a clerically-led civil 
association operated by a vast network of 
representatives, clients, tribal figures and 
ordinary Shi‘i devotees in southern Iraq-- 
especially in cities like Karbala and Najaf. With 
the active involvement of his representatives 
and followers in southern regions, Sistani was 
able to bolster a new Iraqi public sphere, 
largely formed by actors who sponsor various 
religious agendas. Such new publicity can be 
viewed as a sort of public Shi‘i Islam that is 
constructed on new interpretations of justice 
and responsibility inherited from older traditions 
represented by the Hawza or the Shi‘i seminary 
center at Najaf. While competing with other 
forms of public Islam of Sunni and Shi‘i 
variations like the Sadrist movement, Sistani 
has been able to contribute to the Iraqi public 
sphere a religious force with various practices 
and discourses to shaping a sense of public 
based on overlapping, shared traditions based 
on both tribal and clerical authorities.
There are several features in Sistani’s 
contribution to the formation of Iraq’s post-
Baathist public Islam.
1. Sistani’s religious network has increasingly 
become an important source of local 
governance in southern Iraq, where Hawza 
representatives actively participate in 
community affairs with the aim of advancing a 
public good of Islamic orientation.
2. Sistani’s insistence on recognizing Islam 
as a fundamental component of the Iraqi 
constitution has aimed to limit the total 
secularization of the constitution, which is 
[5]
believed to deprive a Muslim country of an 
“authentic” national identity based on its 
Islamic heritage.
3. As an adherent of a democratic Shi‘i 
tradition that dates back to the Persian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911, a 
tradition that has continued to expand with the 
Khatami reformist movement in Iran since 
1997, Sistani has served as a spiritual leader of 
various Shi‘i civic and political groups who are 
actively engaged with public affairs on both 
societal and state levels, especially through the 
electoral process.
Ultimately, the strengthening of such public 
sphere that bolsters the Iraqi civil society, it is 
argued, will pose a serious challenge to the 
antidemocratic current of Sunni insurgency and 
inter- and intra-sectarian tensions that continue 
to act as destabilizing forces in the country. 
However, Sistani’s presence will also create 
problems for various secularist groups, limiting 
their political activities due to lack of popular 
support throughout the southern regions, upon 
which both the stability and the inclusive 
structure of the elected unity government, led 
by Nuri-Maliki, depend. In this sense, the most 
perilous feature of Sistani’s enterprise is the 
possibility for the monopolization of political 
discourse and public opinion, manipulated 
through traditional authority led by the clerical 
establishment.
Although he will continue to remain a 
powerful figure, Sistani’s influence will be 
limited to the ongoing Shi‘i- Shi‘i conflict, largely 
between former exiled political activists, with 
Nuri-Maliki as their representative, and native 
dissidents like Moqtada Sadr, who claim 
authority over the country’s political life. 
However, the most challenging aspect of the 
post-Baathist Iraq remains the U.S. occupation. 
As a major religious figure in the new public 
sphere, Sistani will also have a tremendous 
impact in shaping Iraqi public opinion in 
opposing a long-term U.S. troop presence. In 
light of shaping public opinion, the notion of 
“public Shi‘i Islam” not only evolves around the 
impact of religious leaders and their followers, 
but how their ideas, public statements and 
conceptions of common good, promoted 
through a complex network, will legitimize 
frameworks of shared understanding of public 
interest and normative political action in 
forming a publicity of non-secular disposition, 
perhaps an alternative to a liberal-secular 


















The Ninth Annual Conference of the 
Central Eurasian Studies Society










 The ouster of leadership in three CIS 
countries in a space of less than two years 
through what is known as "coloured revolutions" 
has added a new dimension to US policy in the 
former Soviet space. Not content with NATO's 
east-ward expansion, acquiring military bases in 
Central Asia and building a pipeline from Baku to 
Ceyhan, the US has moved in overtly to oust 
Russia from its neighborhood and minimize its 
external role, which will seriously harm Russia's 
national interests. American policy is to have 
pliant regimes around Russia at any cost, be 
through forced democratization or political and 
economic pressures.
 The involvement of external powers in 
bringing about regime changes in the former 
Soviet republics has complicated the 
democratization process in these newly 
independent countries. Since the US has strong 
geopolitical interests in the Central Asian as well 
as the Caspian region and their neighborhood, its 
use of democracy plank has to be seen in the 
context of advancing those goals. Regimes have 
gained or lost US favor depending on their 
usefulness in promoting US strategic interests in 
the region. Issues of democracy and human 
rights have been sidelined or ignored in countries 
that are US allies though gross violations on these 
scores have been reported. 
US-inspired regime changes have prompted other 
powers, especially Russia, to focus on this region 
as an arena of geopolitical competition. This also 
creates the danger of derailing democratic 
changes in Central Asia. Regimes threatened by 
US "export of democracy" are likely to lean on 
other powers and resist any change towards a 
more liberal system. Great power rivalry insulates 
the ruling elite in post-Soviet states since both 
camps are likely to ignore the shortcomings of 
their respective allies.
 "Export of Democracy" and the resulting 
regime change only replaces leadership, which 
may not necessarily be democratic. It can skew 
the democratization process by activating fissures 
in societies that are already divided on the basis 
of regional/clan or ethnic identities. Competing 
powers can use these fault lines to intensify social 






 This paper examines US policy towards the 
Central Asian region in the early post-Soviet era, 
with a particular focus on the factors that shaped 
the Clinton administration’s perception of the 




Asia was based on a set of normative principles – 
to promote democracy and human rights, 
encourage economic development, promote 
political stability and conflict resolution and 
prevent the rise of political Islam. In counterpoint 
to these stated goals were two distinct sets of 
interests. On the one hand were the interests of 
national security, which include projecting US 
influence in the region, limiting Russian and 
especially Iranian influence, preventing political 
instability and conflict, and combating terrorism. 
On the other hand were US interests in energy 
security. By examining the different phases of US 
policy towards the region, the paper seeks to 
establish which of the identified drivers of US 
policy were most significant and how policy 
outcomes can be explained. This paper is based 
principally on primary source material, including 
interviews with policy makers and academics, as 
well as Congressional and Senate hearings and 




Tugrul Keskin and Gary Wood
Virginia Polytechnic Ins7tute & State University
ABSTRACT: 
According to William Robinson, a primary tool of 
U.S. foreign policy — emergent from the neo-
liberalist process, with historical roots in U.S. 
policy of the 1970’s and 80’s — is the global 
promotion of “democracy” and “human rights”. 
The specific vectors of this new policy are NGOs, 
“think tanks” and non-profit organizations, such 
as the NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 
and the NDI (National Democratic Institute). U.S. 
policy leverages these organizational actors as the 
new ambassadors of imperialism, ushering in 
favorable “democratic” state allies.
 Evidence reveals that the NED and NDI 
may have played integral roles in Georgia's 2003 
"Rose Revolution" and the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” 
of Kyrgyzstan, shaping the conflict and outcomes 
of those movements. We will analyze the role of 
these New Revolutions in the context of U.S. 
policy initiatives that we call the “democracy 
project”, examine the specific roles of NED and 
NDI activities in Central Asia after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and describe the interlocking 
network of organizational actors that are 
leveraged to transform the project of Democracy 
into sanctioned Polyarchy.
For more about CESS 2008, visit the Center for 
Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies 































































































































































































SUBVERSIVE FEMINISTS: A 
NEW GENERATION OF 
KUWAITI WOMEN
By Meredith Katz, Virginia Polytechnic Ins7tute & State University
I did it. I wrote the word on the board. I 
was unsure of the response it would 
receive: fight or flight? It was neither; it was 
acceptance. Lets face it, the “f-word” isn’t all 
that well received in college classrooms 
across the United States. I didn’t expect it to 














The f-word I am speaking of, it’s the “f-
word”--feminism. The principles many students 
agree with but the label they refuse to associate 
themselves with. I prodded further, “what does 
feminism mean?” Students responded, “it means 
equality…it means opportunity…it means edgy.” I 
continued, “how many of you, then, would 
consider yourselves feminists?” Silence. I decided 
now was an appropriate time to formally out 
myself as a feminist, as if there were any 
question by mid-semester. I shared my favorite 
definition of feminism with the all female class: 
feminism is the radical notion that women are 
people. A voice from the front right of the 
classroom blurts out, “oh yeah, that’s 
my screen saver.”
The summer of 2008 I 
had a visiting faculty 
appointment in Cultural 
Anthropology at the 
American University of 
Kuwait (AUK). Prior to 
my early June arrival I 
prepared myself to 
keep my mouth shut 
about most issues, especially gender. Gender 
dictates space, dress, opportunity, and 
expectations in Kuwait. Students didn’t need me 
to introduce the issue of gender; they understand 
it quite well.
Kuwaiti feminism is a bit different than the 
United States variety I am akin to. Different 
obstacles dictate different courses of action. One 
of the primary issues on campus is students’ 
objection to sex segregated classrooms.[1]  While 
AUK is a private, liberal arts institution, the 
university is required to comply with Islamic Law 
and the Private Universities Law of 2000, Article 
6, mandating sex segregated classrooms. Many 
students are outraged that a private, liberal arts 
institution that prides itself on creating a “strong 
and diverse” learning environment must educate 
its students separately. The Voice of AUK, the 
quarterly- published student newspaper, 
published articles entitled “The Social Implications 
of Segregation” and “The Absurdity of the Moral 
Police.” Students question the possibility for equal 
opportunity and upward mobility for women if 
spaces, especially within a university, remain sex 
segregated.
There is a bulletin board on campus devoted 
to student comments on sex-
segregated classrooms (see 
photos, next page). The 




religion have nothing 
to do with one another; 
no to segregation, no to 
dress code; co-edu; integration 
leads you to success; the only difference between 
us is biology.” Perhaps many of these students, 
like those in my class, do not see their 
declarations as explicitly feminist. Perhaps others 
do.
“Hooray for us. It’s finally like we’re human!” 
Maryam exclaimed. For a class assignment 
students were instructed to discuss an example of 
how globalization has impacted cultures around 
the world. Maryam’s choice: women’s rights. Her 
comment referenced the recent 2005 decision 
that gave Kuwaiti women the right to vote. 
SUBVERSIVE FEMINISTS: A NEW GENERATION OF KUWAITI WOMEN
Con7nued
The “f-word” isn’t all that well 
received in college classrooms 
across the United States. I didn’t 
expect it to be any better in 
Kuwait. I was wrong.
[13]
Maryam was in class the day I 
first introduced the f-word. She 
was silent that day. Today she’s 
ecstatic for the opportunity to 
vote, and in her words, to be 
seen as human.
Amnah’s a feisty one. She 
came into class today all fired 
up because she watched a 
music video yesterday and was 
instantly aware of how the 
positionality of the male singer 
subjugated the women 
surrounding him. “I can’t believe 
this stuff happens. It’s (gender 
oppression) everywhere,” she 
tells me. I told 
Amnah she has 
discovered the 
blessing and the 
curse of social 
consciousness: once you know, 
you can’t act like you don’t.
Appearances lie, or at best, 
lead to rash judgment. Every 
day Amnah attends class fully 
covered in long pants, a long-
sleeved shirt and a hijab. Some 
Western feminists may perceive 
Amnah’s dress as indicative of 
the oppression Muslim women 
face. This very well may be the 
case. It may also be that we 
cannot accurately discern 
women’s opinions on gender 
and politics solely off 
appearance. It was, after all, 
Amnah whose screen saver 
reads, “feminism is the radical 
notion that women are people” 


















wore a pink dress the day I taught gender.
Roughly half the women on AUK’s campus 
cover, most often only with a hijab. Since hair, 
particularly long hair, is commonly a marker of 
femininity, women have found alternative means 
of display. Many women come to campus 
adorned with expensive jewelry, heavy make 
up, stiletto heels, and designer purses. 
They have blended the religious and 
cultural traditions of Islam with the 
undeniable influence of Western fashion.
This is a new generation of Kuwaiti 
women. A generation keenly aware of 
the opportunities available to them and a 
willingness to fight for those that are not. 
A generation still devout in religious and 
cultural practices, but one that refuses to be 
defined by them. A generation that has 
explored alternative definitions of femininity. A 
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